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This work makes a joint analysis of prevention and saving decisions. First we determine
the optimal levels of the two variables and we analyze substitution between them. Second we
provide some comparative statics results in order to determine the eects on optimal saving
and prevention of changes in exogenous present and future wealth and in possible future loss.
Finally we introduce insurance into the model and we extend the separation result, derived in
the literature which studies the substitution between insurance and saving, to the case where
prevention is considered too.
1 Introduction
Prevention of a risk by an agent can be dened as the eort exerted by the agent in order to lower
the probability of the occurrence of an event generating a loss in wealth. Given this denition, it is
easy to see that, since prevention reduces the probability of a loss, it is used in order to deal with risk.
The choice about it can thus be naturally related to the choice about the other instrument typically
used for the same purpose, which is insurance.
This issue was originally analyzed by [Becker and Erlich (1972)], who study the substitution eects
between insurace, self-insurance and prevention in an expected utility model where prevention has
a simultaneous eect on the probability of the loss. In this framework, insurance and self-insurance
are shown to be denitely substitutes, while insurance and prevention can be complements because
of their mutually related eects on moral hazard.
On the other hand, if we examine a two-period framework, insurance can be seen as a substitute for
saving, since a share of total saving, called precautionary saving, is dedicated to dealing with risk.
This problem was rst examined by [Moet (1975), (1977)] under restrictive assumptions and then
by [Dionne and Eeckhoudt (1984)] in a generalized framework. [Dionne and Eeckhoudt (1984)], in
particular, found that a complementary or substitution eect between prevention and saving cannot
be unambiguously established, in general, while perfect substitution occurs under the assumption of
decreasing temporal risk aversion. Finally they show that, in the case of fair insurance premium, there
is a separation between the two instruments: insurance is completely devoted to removing risk and
saving is used for consumption smoothing.
The relationship between prevention and saving has not been analysed yet in this context. This
is because prevention has been treated only as an instrument whose eects occur simultaneously
on the probability of a loss in wealth; in fact, prevention tends to be considered only in a single-
period framework. However, a prevention model in a two-period framework was recently studied by
[Menegatti (2009)]. In fact, as noted by Menegatti:
12
\in many other situations, the eort in prevention is not contemporaneous with its eect on probabil-
ity; it precedes this eect. This happens in cases such as the following three:
a) if a driver attends a safe-driving course today, this reduces the probability of a car accident in the
future;
b) if a householder buys a house alarm today, this reduces the probability of a burglary in the future;
c) if a smoker gives up smoking today, this reduces the probability of disease in the future.
Clearly, in these cases the usual one-period framework cannot be used to analyse the optimal level of
prevention. A two-period framework is suitable." [Menegatti (2009), p. 394]. 1
Starting from this idea, this work aims to provide a joint analysis of prevention and saving decisions.
The paper has three main goals. First we determine the optimal levels of the two choice variables
and we analyse substitution or complementarity between them. Second we provide some comparative
statics results in order to determine the eects on optimal saving and prevention of changes in ex-
ogenous present and future wealth and in the possible future loss. Finally we study the eect of the
introduction of insurance into the model under the assumption of fair premium and we extend the
[Dionne and Eeckhoudt (1984)] separation result to the case where prevention is considered.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 examines substitution
between prevention and saving. Section 4 provides comparative statics results. Section 5 shows the
extended separation result. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
We assume that the agent chooses the optimal levels of saving s and prevention eort e in order to
maximize her total utility V (s; e) in a two-period horizon. For simplicity, we assume that wealth in
period 0 (the "present") is certain, while in period 1 (the "future") the agent faces two states of the
world: the "bad" one, where she incurs the loss l, and the "good" one, where no loss occurs. The
agent's maximisation problem is thus
max
s;e
V (s;e) = max
s;e

u(w0   s   e) +




where u(:) is the utility function, p(e) is the probability that the damaging event generating the loss
l occurs, w0 and w1 are respectively the wealth endowment of period 0 and period 1, both certain, r
is the interest rate and  is the intertemporal discount factor.
As usual, function u(:) is assumed to be strictly increasing and strictly concave, that is u0(:) > 0 and
u00(:) < 0; this last assumption indicates risk aversion. We also assume p0(e) to be strictly negative,
so that an increase in eort causes a reduction in the probability of the loss.
Given problem (1), we get the two following rst-order conditions:








where I0 = w0   s   e, I1B = w1 + s(1 + r)   l, I1G = w1 + s(1 + r). It is worth noticing that if
I1B = I1G, i.e. l = 0, there is no incentive to exert any eort. Conversely, the bigger the wealth gap
between the two states of the world in period 1, the greater the benet from exerting eort in the
present.
The second-order conditions are








1[Menegatti (2009)] shows that, in a two-period framework, prudence, i.e. a positive third derivative of the util-
ity function, has an increasing eect on optimal prevention. Conversely, [Eeckhoudt and Gollier (2005)] previously
concluded that the opposite occurs in a one-period framework.3
VssVee   (Vse)











While (4) is automatically satised by the concavity of u(:), a sucient condition for Vee < 0 is p(e)
to be convex in e. This assumption is quite natural since it generates the plausible implication that
the marginal eect of prevention is decreasing for p(e) approaching 1. For these reasons we explicitly
assume p00(e) > 0.
3 Substitution between prevention and saving
As pointed out above, equations (2) and (3) together determine the set of equilibrium pairs (e;s)
ensuring that agent's utility is maximised. If an equilibrium exists, though, it is not necessarily
unique. In fact, looking at the expressions of the rst-order conditions, it is clear that the number of
equilibria depends on various factors, including the assumptions on the third derivative of the utility
function with respect to saving (i.e. agent's attitude toward "prudence"), and on the third derivative
of the function p(e).
Although we do not know how many equilibria exist, the comparison between them allows us to get
some early indications on the substitability between eort and saving. In particular, we have that:
Proposition 3.1. Assume that there exist N equilibrium pairs (ei;si) with i = 1;::;N. If ek > ej
with k 6= j, then sk < sj.




 u00 (I0)   p0(e)[u0 (I1B)   u0 (I1G)] 1+r
1+




This means that (2) implies in equilibrium s = f(e) with f0(e) < 0. This proves the proposition.
Proposition 3.1 shows that, assuming that multiple equilibrium pairs (e;s) exist and comparing these
dierent equilbria, there is a negative relationship between e and s. This means that, moving from one
equilibrium to another, we have a substitution eect between prevention and saving (larger prevention
implies smaller saving).
Another conclusion in the same direction can be obtained by explaining the eect on e and s of
an exogenous change in the interest rate r. Indeed, since the interest rate is the return of saving,
the responses of the two variables of choice to a change in it provide a further indication on the
substitability between them. In order to do this, we totally dierentiate (2) and (3) with respect to
the endogenous variables e and s and the exogenous interest rate r, obtaining:
Veede + Vesds =  Verdr (8)















fp(e)[u00(I1B)] + [1   p(e)]u00(I1G)g+
1
1 + 
fp(e)[u0(I1B)] + [1   p(e)]u0(I1G)g
(11)
and
















(VesVer   VsrVee) (14)4
where D = VeeVss  (Ves)2 , which is greater than 0 by the second-order conditions. Since the sign of
Vsr is ambiguous, the signs of de
dr and ds
dr are ambiguous too. We thus try to solve the ambiguity of
the sign Vsr.
The derivative Vsr measures the eect of a change in the optimal level of saving due to a change in r.
In order to study this eect in more detail, we look to the simpler case where we have no uncertainty
(and thus obviously no prevention). In this case the agent's problem becomes
max
s V (s) = max
s






The rst-order condition of this problem is





Vsr = u00(w1 + s(1 + r))
s(1 + r)
1 + 




Note that the sign of the expression Vsr is ambiguous. This ambiguity depends on the contemporaneous
presence of two eects: the substitution eect between present and future consumption related to a
change of r (represented by the term u0 (w1 + s(1 + r)) 1
1+) and the income eect due to the increase
of r (represented by the term u00 (w1 + s(1 + r))
s(1+r)
1+ ). It seems plausible to assume that the rst
eect prevails. If this occurs, Vsr > 0.
Examining (11), it is clear that the two terms in it are similar to those in (17). For this reason we
have that if the substitution eect on s of a change in r prevails on the income eect, we have Vsr > 0
also in the framework with uncertainty of (11). This, together with (13) and (14) implies in turn
Proposition 3.2. If the substitution eect on s of a change in r prevails on the income eect due to
the change, then an increase in r raises s (ds
dr > 0) and reduces e (de
dr < 0).
Proposition 3.2 shows that when the interest rate increases, we have that, under plausible conditions,
saving increases and prevention decreases. Since the interest rate is the return of saving, this conrms
the conjecture that the two instruments are substitutes.
4 Comparative statics








In general the sign of all these derivatives is ambiguous. This result is due to the interaction between
the two instruments in pursuing the agent's two objectives: to smooth consumption between the
two periods and to face uncertainty. Note that this result is analogous to the conclusion reached
by [Dionne and Eeckhoudt (1984)], who nd that changes in dierent parameters have, in general,
ambiguous eects on the optimal levels of insurance and saving.
Given this premise, some specic conclusions can be obtained by introducing some conditions on the
parameters and the functions of the model. Consider, in particular, the three following conditions:
p0(e)[u0(I1B)   u0(I1G)] > fp(e)u00(I1B) + [1   p(e)]u00(I1G)g(1 + r) (18)
p0(e)[u0(I1B)   u0(I1G)](1 + r) > p00(e)[u(I1B)   u(I1G)] (19)
p0(e)u0(I1B) > p(e)u00(I1B)(1 + r) (20)
Given conditions (18), (19) and (20), it is possible to show that
Proposition 4.1.  If inequality (18) is satised, then de
dw0 > 0 and de
dw1 > 0. If the opposite of
inequality (18) is satised, then de
dw0 < 0 and de
dw1 < 0.5
 If inequality (19) is satised, then ds
dw0 > 0. If the opposite of inequality (19) is satised, then
ds
dw0 < 0.
 If inequalities (18) and (19) are satised, then ds
dw1 < 0. If the opposite of inequalities (18) and
(19) is satised, then ds
dw1 > 0.
 If inequality (18) and the opposite of inequality (20) are satised, then de
dl > 0. If the opposite
of inequality (18) and inequality (20) are satised, then de
dl < 0.
 If inequalities (19) and (20) are satised, then ds
dl > 0. If the opposite of inequalities (19) and
(20) is satised, then ds
dl < 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The three conditions represent the comparison between the eciency of the two instruments with
regard to dierent aspects. In particular, condition (18) compares the impact of a (innitesimally
small) variation of e and s on marginal intertemporal utility of saving.2 Similarly, condition (19)
compares the impact of a (innitesimally small) variation of e and s on marginal intertemporal utility
of prevention.3 Finally, condition (20) compares the impact of a (innitesimally small) variation of e
and s on marginal intertemporal utility of saving in the bad state of the world.4
Given this interpretation, Proposition 4.1 shows how the sign of changes in s and e caused by changes
in w0, w1 and l depends on the relative eciency of the two instruments in aecting marginal in-
tertemporal utility. In case of a change in w0 and in w1, all the relevant conditions refers to both
states of the world. In case of a change in l, the condition on marginal utility of saving depends only
on the eciency in the bad state.
5 Extended separation result
As anticipated in Section One, [Dionne and Eeckhoudt (1984)] examine the substitution between in-
surance and saving in a two-period model. One of their main results shows that the introduction of
a fair (or actuarial) insurance premium determines a \separation" between insurance and saving. In
this case, in fact, agents choose to buy full insurance, using this instrument in order to face uncer-
tainty. The other instrument (i.e. saving) is thus used only for the purpose of consumption smoothing
between the two periods.
This separation result obviously does not hold in a context of unfair (or non-actuarial) premia. In
this case, it is no longer necessarily true that insurance is the most ecient instrument to cover future
losses, so saving is both an instrument to smooth consumption as well as a substitute for insurance
in protection against future losses.
It can be shown that our framework too yield a separation result. In fact, introducing insurance
with a fair premium into our model implies the determination of dierent specic goals for insurance,
prevention and saving.
















w1 + s(1 + r)   l + X

+ [1   p(e)]u








where X is the chosen amount of insurance coverage purchased by the agent and   1 is the loading
factor applied by the insurance company on the actuarial premium. From (21) we get the following
2Note that the left-hand side and the right-hand side of (18) are the derivatives of (2), i.e the rst-order condition
referred to saving, respectively with regard to e and s.
3Note that the left-hand side and the right-hand side of (19) are the derivatives of (3), i.e the rst-order condition
referred to prevention, respectively with regard to s and e.
4Note that the left-hand side and the right-hand side of (20) are the derivatives of (2), i.e. the rst-order condition





















where we have now I0 = w0   s   e   
p(e)X
1+r , I1B = w1 + s(1 + r)   l + X and I1G = w1 + s(1 + r).







From (25) it is cleat that, when the insurance premium is fair, i.e. when  = 1, u0(I1G) must equal
u0(I1B), which implies
X = l (26)


















Equations (26),(27) and (28) show the specic goal for each instrument.
First, equation (26) shows that the agent chooses a level of insurance equal to her loss, implying that
she chooses full insurance. This means that insurance is used by the agent to completely remove
uncertainty.
Given full insurance, the choice of the level of prevention does not inuence future wealth, which is
now certain. This choice, however, aects present wealth in two opposite directions since it determines
the level of the fair premium and the cost due to eort exerted. In particular, a larger e implies both a
larger eort exerted (reducing wealth in period 0) and a smaller fair premium
p(e)l
1+r , (increasing wealth
in period 0). The choice of e in equation (27) ensures that the balance between these two eects is
such that the quantity  
p(e)l
1+r   e is minimized, and thus that wealth in period 0 is maximized (with
regard to e). In other words the choice of e is such that the insurance premium paid is reduced until
the marginal benet from this reduction is larger than the marginal eort necessary to obtain it.
Finally, given full insurance and optimal prevention determined by (27), the agent has to choose the
optimal allocation of consumption between the two periods. This is ensured by the level of saving
determined in equation (28), where (given e from (27)) the expected marginal utilities in the two
periods are equalised by the choice of s. Saving is thus dedicated to the purpose of consumption
smoothing.
The extended separation result just described also provides a clear indication with regard to compar-
ative statics in the case of fair insurance premium. In particular, in this case, it is easy to see that
optimal insurance X is determined by the level of the loss l. Obviously, since we desire full insurance,
an increase in loss implies an increase in the insurance level.
Optimal prevention e is aected by l and r. In particular, since p0(e) < 0 and p00(e) > 0 it is clear
that we have de
dl > 0 andde
dr < 0. These results indicate that a larger l (r) implies a larger (smaller)
insurance premium, inducing in turn a larger (smaller) prevention.
Lastly optimal saving s is aected by w0, w1,  and r. In particular we have ds
dw0 > 0, ds
dw1 < 0,
ds
d < 0 and ds
dr ambiguous. In fact, considering equation (28), since u00 < 0, an increase in w0 implies
a decrease in the left-hand side of the equation. Since the right-hand side is not changed and since
de
dw0 = 0, equation (28) is now satised only if saving is larger. Similarly, if w1 increased then the





since the denominator of the right-hand
side cannot be negative.
6This is clear since, by substituting (26) in (22), we get u'(I0)[1 + 
p0(e)l
1+r ] = 0.7
right-hand side of (28) decreases. Since the left-hand side is not changed and since de
dw1 = 0, equation
(28) is now satised if saving is smaller. Again, if  is larger the right-hand side of (28) is smaller,
implying that, since the left-hand side is not changed and since de
d = 0, s has to be smaller for equation




































meaning that the sign of ds
dr is ambiguous.





which are the same of a simple two-period problem in certainty framework. The rst two describe
the eect of present and future wealth on smoothing, the third describes the eect of impatience on
the saving level, while the last spells out the usual eect of the return from savings (described by
equations (15),(16) and (17) in Section Three).7
As in the case studied by [Dionne and Eeckhoudt (1984)], when considering an unfair premium, i.e
when  > 1, the full insurance condition no longer holds and the separation between the instruments
disappears. In this case, all three instrument act together to face disutility due to uncertainty, to
reduce insurance premium and to optimally allocate wealth between the two periods. For this reason,
for  > 1, we nd that the sign of the eects of parameter changes is ambiguous.
We emphasize that these last results are coherent with the ndings of Dionne and Eeckhoudt, who
obtain a clear direction for some eects only by imposing specic conditions in the case with saving
and insurance (and no prevention). Similar conclusions on comparative statics are obtained in Section
Three in the case with saving and prevention (and no insurance). The results obtained in the presence
of the three instruments together and for  > 1 are however much more complex and no simple
condition ensuring clear indications on them can be derived. For this reason we choose to omit the
ndings for  > 1.
6 Conclusion
This work examines the optimal choice of savings and prevention in a two-period model with uncertain
future wealth. Three main aspects were analysed.
First, with regard to the relationship between the optimal levels of the two instruments, we found
that there is a kind of substitution between prevention and saving in equilibrium. In fact, comparing
dierent equilibria, if they exist, we found that they are characterised by a decreasing relationship
between saving and prevention (If saving is larger in one equilibrium than in another, then prevention
is smaller). Furthermore, in the same context, we showed that a change in the interest rate (which is
the return of saving) has, under usual conditions, an opposite eect on the two instruments, increasing
saving and decreasing prevention.
Second, we examined comparative statics, studying the eects on prevention and saving of changes
in the endowment wealth w0 and w1 and in the loss l. We showed that, in general, all these eects
are ambiguous since, as the two instruments are substitutes, we cannot determine the signs of the
changes in their optimal levels without introducing specic assumptions. However, clearly determined
results can be derived by introducing conditions on the relative eciency of the two choice variables
on intertemporal marginal utility. We showed that dierent combinations of these conditions allow to
indicate the direction of all the eects analysed.
Finally we extended the separation result derived, given a fair insurance premium, by [Dionne and Eeckhoudt (1984)]
in the case of two instruments (insurance and saving) to the case of three instruments (insurance, sav-
ing and prevention). We showed that, in this case, full insurance is used in order to remove uncertainty,
prevention is used in order to reduce the insurance premium and saving is used for smoothing. Under
the same assumptions we also provide some comparative statics results conrming this interpretation.
7Equation (29) incudes the term  u00(I0)
p(e)l
(1+r)2 , absent in (17), which is due to the eect of r on wealth in period
0.8
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7 Appendix
In order to provide comparative statics for prevention and saving and to prove the results in Proposition
4.1, we totally dierentiate (2) and (3) with respect to the exogenous parameters w0, w1 and l. Letting
Vsk = @
2V
@s@k and Vek = @
2V
@e@k we get
Veede + Vesds =  Vekdk (30)
Vesde + Vssds =  Vskdk (31)
for k = w0;w1;l, where Vee = u00(I0) + p00(e)
[u(I1B) u(I1G)]




1+ < 0, Ves = u00 (I0) + p0(e)[u0 (I1B)   u0 (I1G)] 1+r
1+ < 0.













for k = w0;w1;l and where D = VeeVss   (Ves)2 > 0.Given this general premise, we now consider the
three specic cases where k is w0, w1 or l. Note that we present proofs for derivatives to be positive.
The proofs for negative derivatives follows the same steps.
 k = w0
In this case we get that
Vsw0 = Vew0 =  u00(I0) > 0












Vsw0 (Ves   Vee)
Since Vsw0 is positive, the sings of de
dw0 and ds
dw0 are determined respectively by the sign of
Ves   Vss and Ves   Vee. These dierences are equal to
Ves   Vss = p0(e)[u0(I1B)   u0(I1G)]
1 + r
1 + 
  [p(e)u00(I1B) + [1   p(e)]u00(I1G)]
(1 + r)2
1 + 9
Ves   Vee = p0(e)[u0(I1B)   u0(I1G)]
1 + r
1 + 
  p00(e)[u(I1B)   u(I1G)]
1
1 + 
By these two equations it can be easily seen, after simple computations, that sucient conditions
for Ves   Vss and Ves   Vee to be positive are respectively (18) and (19)
 k = w1










[p(e)u00(I1B) + [1   p(e)]u00(I1G)]
1 + r
1 + 




 [p(e)u00(I1B) + [1   p(e)]u00(I1G)]
(1 + r)2
1 + 




+u00(I0)[p(e)u00(I1B) + [1   p(e)]u00(I1G)]
1 + r
1 + 




Simple computations show that a sucient condition for the last espression to be positive is
p0(e)[u0(I1B)   u0(I1G)] > [p(e)u00(I1B) + [1   p(e)]u00(I1G)](1 + r)
which is inequality (18).
With regard to the sign of ds
dw1 = 1
D [Vew1Ves   Vsw1Vee] note that, as stated before, condition
(19) ensures that Ves   Vee > 0, or, equivalently, Ves > Vee. Given that both Ves and Vee are
negative quantities, the opposite of (19) guarantees that jVesj > jVeej. Now computing Vsw1 and
Vew1 we get








Then, holding the opposite of (19), and since both Vew1 and Vsw1 are negative, it is sucient to
nd a condition for which jVew1j is greater than jVsw1j to claim that ds
dw1 > 0.
Obviously jVew1j > jVsw1j if Vsw1 > Vew1. After easy manipulations, we get that this last
inequality is satised if:
[p(e)u00(I1B) + [1   p(e)]u00(I1G)](1 + r) > p0(e)[u0(I1B)   u0(I1G)]
which is the opposite of inequality (18).
 k = l









Let now suppose that (18) holds: as proven before, this guarantees that jVssj > jVesj, or,
equivalently, that Ves > Vss, given that both Vss and Ves are negative. Given that de
dl =
1
D [VslVes   VelVss], in order to claim that de
dl > 0, we need Vel > Vsl. This occurs if
p(e)u00(I1B)(1 + r) > p0(e)u0(I1B)
which is the opposite of inequality (20).
To ensure the positivity of ds
dl = 1
D [VelVes   VslVee], we nally need both Vsl > Vel and jVeej >
jVesj. Given the previous results, the former is implied by condition (20), while the latter is
implied by condition (19).